

Message Text

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S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 5 MBFR VIENNA 0185

MBFR NEGOTIATIONS

FROM US REP MBFR

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PARM, NATO

SUBJECT: MBFR NEGOTIATIONS: AD HOC GROUP REPORT
TO THE NATO COUNCIL - PART 1

BEGIN SUMMARY: BELOW IS THE TWXT OF PART 1 OF
THE AD HOC GROUP REPORT TO THE NORTH ATLANTIC
COUNCIL, AS TENTATIVELY APPROVED JULY 19 BY THE
AD HOC GROUP, AND WHICH WILL BE DELIVERED JULY 26
BY THE BELGIAN REP AS SPOKESMAN FOR THE AD HOC
GROUP. PART 2 OF THE AD HOC GROUP REPORT WILL BE
CONSIDERED BY THE AHG AT ITS NEXT SCHEDULED MEETING
ON JULY 22. BOTH PARTS OF THE AHG REPORT WILL BE
TRANSMITTED TO THE NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL

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AS ONE DOCUMENT. END SUMMARY.

BEGIN TEXT:

INTRODUCTION

1. THIS REPORT OF THE AD HOC GROUP ON THE MBFR NEGOTIATIONS IN VIENNA COVERS THE PERIOD FROM THE RESUMPTION OF THE NEGOTIATIONS ON MAY 6, 1974 THROUGH THE LAST PLENARY ON JULY 18, 1974 AND UPDATES THE AHG REPORT OF APRIL 5 ON THE PREVIOUS ROUND.

2. PART ONE OF THIS REPORT CONTAINS THE GROUP'S ANALYSIS AND ASSESSMENT OF THE PRESENT STATE OF THE VIENNA NEGOTIATIONS. PART TWO CONTAINS REQUESTS FROM THE GROUP FOR GUIDANCE ON ISSUES NOW BEFORE THE COUNCIL AND ON SOME QUESTIONS EITHER ALREADY RAISED OR LIKELY TO BE RAISED BY THE EAST.

PART ONE: CURRENT STATUS OF MBFR NEGOTIATIONS

I. OVERVIEW

3. THE VIENNA MBFR NEGOTIATIONS HAVE BEEN UNDERWAY FOR NINE MONTHS. IN THIS TIME, THE ALLIES HAVE ESTABLISHED AN ALLIED COORDINATING MECHANISM WHICH HAS EFFICIENTLY DEvised TACTICS FOR NEGOTIATION WITH THE EAST WHILE MAINTAINING ALLIED COHESION. THEY HAVE FURTHER DEVELOPED THE ALLIED POSITION, ESTABLISHED A GOOD WORKING RELATIONSHIP WITH THE EAST, AND ACHIEVED AT LEAST THE BEGINNING OF THE COMMON ANALYSIS OF ISSUES WHICH IS A NECESSARY BASIS FOR ANY AGREEMENT.

4. EASTERN REPRESENTATIVES HAVE REMAINED BUSINESS-LIKE IN THEIR APPROACH TO THE NEGOTIATIONS AND CONTINUE TO PROFESS THEIR COMMITMENT TO A POSITIVE OUTCOME. HOWEVER, THERE HAS AS YET BEEN SO SUBSTANTIVE PROGRESS IN THE NEGOTIATIONS.

5. IN THE LATEST ROUND OF THE NEGOTIATIONS, THE ALLIES
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CONTINUED TO CONCENTRATE ON THE PROBLEM OF BRINGING THE EAST TO ACCEPT THE IDEA THAT THE US AND SOVIET UNION SHOULD REDUCE FIRST AND THAT REDUCTIONS BY REMAINING DIRECT PARTICIPANTS SHOULD BE DEFERRED TO A SECOND PHASE OF NEGOTIATIONS. IN DOING SO, THE AHG USED THE NAC GUIDANCE RECEIVED DURING THIS ROUND. EASTERN REPRESENTATIVES HAVE EXPRESSED SOME INTEREST IN THE WESTERN PROPOSALS, BUT HAVE SAID THAT THESE ALLIED SUGGESTIONS DO NOT DEPART FROM THE

BASIC ALLIED POSITION ON PHASING, WHICH REMAINS UNACCEPTABLE TO THE EAST.

6. WHILE CONTINUING TO MAINTAIN THEIR NOVEMBER 8 PROPOSALS, IN INFORMAL SESSIONS THE EAST RESURRECTED IN A MODIFIED FORM THE "SYMBOLIC REDUCTION PROPOSAL" WHICH THEY HAD FLOATED BEFORE THE EASTER RECESS TERMING IT A "FIRST STEP AGREEMENT." ALTHOUGH THIS FIRST STEP WOULD CONTAIN THE MAIN ELEMENTS OF THE EASTERN POSITION, THE EAST SHOWED A SLIGHT DEGREE OF FLEXIBILITY ON PHASING, BUT ONLY WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF A FIRST STEP AGREEMENT OF LIMITED SCOPE AND DURATION. THE EAST ALSO SOUGHT TO CHANGE THE FOCUS OF THE INFORMAL DISCUSSIONS INTO A SEARCH FOR A FIRST STEP AGREEMENT.

7. IN ESSENCE, THE GROUP BELIEVES THAT ALTHOUGH THE TALKS ARE MOVING SLOWLY, THEY ARE ENABLING THE ALLIES TO DEVELOP THEIR POSITION IN AN ORDERLY AND CAUTIOUS WAY AND TO EXPLORE EASTERN VIEWS. WHILE REMAINING WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF AGREED ALLIED POLICY, THE ALLIANCE WILL IN THE AUTUMN ROUND OF TALKS NEED TO ELABORATE FURTHER ON ITS POSITION WITH THE EAST IN ORDER TO MAINTAIN THE INITIATIVE, TO KEEP THE FOCUS OF THE NEGOTIATIONS ON THE ALLIED RATHER THAN THE EASTERN PROGRAM TO THE EXTENT POSSIBLE, AND TO ENSURE SOME MOMENTUM TO THE NEGOTIATIONS.

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MBFR NEGOTIATIONS

FROM US REP MBFR

II. ALLIED APPROACH

8. AFTER RECONVENING ON MAY 6, THE AHG DECIDED THAT ITS CONTINUED PRIORITY TACTICAL OBJECTIVE FOR THE SPRING ROUND SHOULD BE TO BRING THE EAST TO AGREE TENTATIVELY THAT REDUCTIONS BY ALLIED DIRECT PARTICIPANTS OTHER THAN THE US SHOULD BE DEFERRED TO A SECOND PHASE OF NEGOTIATIONS. TO THAT END, THE NO-INCREASE PROVISION WAS PRESENTED AT THE MAY 22 INFORMAL MEETING AND THE FIXED PERIOD OF TIME CONCEPT AND REVIEW PROVISIONS WERE PRESENTED AT THE JUNE 5 INFORMAL MEETING. THE "ALL-PARTICIPANTS" OFFER WAS PRESENTED AT THE JULY 10 INFORMAL MEETING. THE ALLIED REPRESENTATIVES MADE CLEAR, IN EACH CASE, THAT ALL THESE POINTS WOULD BE CONTINGENT ON REACHING A SATISFACTORY FIRST PHASE

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AGREEMENT, INCLUDING COMMITMENT TO THE COMMON CEILING CONCEPT.

9. BY THE SUMMER RECESS, THE ALLIES HAD PRESENTED THEIR POSITION ON PHASING TO THE EAST IN THE FOLLOWING TERMS:

THE US CONTINUES READY TO REDUCE IN A FIRST PHASE. AS REGARDS OTHER WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS, WHILE THEY REMAIN UNWILLING TO REDUCE THEIR FORCES IN A FIRST PHASE, THE ALLIES ARE READY TO UNDERTAKE SIGNIFICANT COMMITMENTS REGARDING THEIR FORCES IN THE CONTEXT OF A SATISFACTORY FIRST PHASE AGREEMENT, WHICH WOULD INCLUDE AGREEMENT ON THE COMMON CEILING CONCEPT. MORE SPECIFICALLY, THE ALLIES EXPRESSED TO THE EAST THEIR WILLINGNESS TO CONSIDER UNDERTAKING SUCH COMMITMENTS IN THE FOLLOWING TERMS:

A. THE ALLIES HAVE STATED THEIR READINESS TO AGREE IN A FIRST PHASE ON A SPECIFIC COMMON CEILING LEVEL WHICH WOULD REFLECT THE OVERALL DIMENSIONS OF GROUND FORCE REDUCTIONS TO BE TAKEN IN BOTH PHASES.

B. THEY HAVE SAID THAT THE WESTERN CONTRIBUTION TO SECOND PHASE REDUCTIONS WOULD FOCUS ON THE FORCES OF OTHER WESTERN DIRECT

PARTICIPANTS.

C. THEY HAVE SAID THEY ARE READY TO WORK OUT WITH THE EAST THE TIME FOR THE BEGINNING OF THE SECOND PHASE OF NEGOTIATIONS.

D. THEY ARE READY TO ENTER ON A MUTUAL COMMITMENT NOT TO INCREASE THE OVERALL LEVEL OF GROUND FORCE MANPOWER ON BOTH SIDES BETWEEN THE PHASES.

E. THEY ARE READY TO WORK OUT A PROVISION IN A FIRST PHASE AGREEMENT FOR REVIEW OF THE SITUATION WITHIN A SPECIFIC PERIOD OF TIME, A PERIOD WHICH WOULD REPRESENT WHAT BOTH SIDES CONSIDERED A REASONABLE DURATION FOR A SECOND PHASE NEGOTIATION.

F. WITH REGARD TO EASTERN QUESTIONS WHETHER THE REMAINING WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS WOULD REDUCE THEIR FORCES, THE ALLIES SAID THAT AS A FINAL STEP THEY WERE WILLING TO CONSIDER A COMMITMENT TO THE EFFECT THAT THE WESTERN CONTRIBUTION TO SECOND PHASE
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REDUCTIONS TO AN AGREED COMMON CEILING ON OVERALL GROUND FORCE MANPOWER OF EACH SIDE WOULD INCLUDE REDUCTIONS IN THE GROUND FORCES IN THE AREA OF ALL NON-US WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS. ALLIED REPRESENTATIVES STATED THAT LUXEMBOURG FORCES WOULD BE EXCEPTED FROM SUCH A COMMITMENT AND WOULD NOT BE REDUCED. IT WAS MADE CLEAR THAT THE ALLIES COULD UNDERTAKE SUCH A COMMITMENT ONLY IN THE EVENT OF A SATISFACTORY FIRST PHASE AGREEMENT.

10. THE OVERALL ALLIED LINKAGE PRESENTATION ENGENDERED INTEREST, QUESTIONS AND CRITICISM ON THE PART OF THE EAST, CLAIMING THAT EVEN CUMULATIVELY, THEY DID NOT REPRESENT A DEPARTURE FROM THE BASIC WESTERN POSITION ON PHASING. EASTERN REPRESENTATIVES SEEMED PARTICULARLY INTERESTED IN THE NO-INCREASE PROVISION, BUT WERE CRITICAL OF ITS FAILURE TO TAKE ACCOUNT OF ARMAMENTS AND ALSO OF ITS LIMITED DURATION, WHICH THEY SAID WAS INEQUITABLE IN VIEW OF THE ENDURING OBLIGATION ENTAILED IN FIRST PHASE SOVIET REDUCTIONS. THE EAST MERELY TOOK NOTE OF WESTERN READINESS TO NEGOTIATE ON THE DURATION OF A FIXED OF TIME BETWEEN THE TWO PHASES OF NEGOTIATIONS. THE EAST WAS SKEPTICAL ABOUT THE PROPOSED REVIEW PROVISION, CLAIMING THAT THE POSSIBILITY OF WITHDRAWAL FROM PHASE I AGREEMENTS REPRESENTED TOO DRASTIC A REMEDY SHOULD PHASE II PROVE UNSUCCESSFUL BECAUSE THE SOVIETS COULD NOT REDEPLOY THEIR REDUCED FORCES TO CENTRAL EUROPE WITHOUT SERIOUSLY JEOPARDIZING DETENTE. ALTHOUGH PRIVATELY SOME EASTERN REPRESENTATIVES CONCEDED THAT THE WEST HAD MADE A SIGNIFICANT STEP WITH THE "ALL PARTICIPANTS" FORMULA, THEIR REACTION, BOTH IN THE FINAL INFORMAL AND PLENARY SESSIONS, WAS TO ATTACK IT.

EASTERN CRITICISMS WERE THAT THIS FORMULA DID NOT CHANGE

THE BASIC WESTERN POSITION; THAT IT WAS HEAVILY CONDITIONAL;
THAT IT DID NOT CONTAIN ANY COMMITMENT AS TO THE SIZE AND
TIMING OF THE REDUCTIONS TO BE TAKEN BY THE OTHER WESTERN
DIRECT PARTICIPANTS; AND THAT -- IN ANY CASE -- A
COMMITMENT TO REDUCE WAS IMPLICIT ALREADY IN THE
COMMUNIQUE OF JUNE 28, 1973. THE EAST DID NOT SEEM TO
OBJECT TO THE EXCLUSION OF LUXEMBOURG FORCES FROM
REDUCTIONS.

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MBFR NEGOTIATIONS

FROM US REP MBFR

11. IN COUNTERING THESE EASTERN CRITICISMS, ALLIED
REPRESENTATIVES EMPHASIZED THAT REMAINING WESTERN DIRECT
PARTICIPANTS HAD IN THE CURRENT ROUND OFFERED A NUMBER
OF NEW SPECIFIC COMMITMENTS REGARDING REDUCTION OF THEIR
FORCES. THESE COMMITMENTS WOULD HAVE THE EFFECT OF

DEALING IN PHASE I WITH CERTAIN ISSUES WHICH -- UNDER THE ORIGINAL ALLIED CONCEPT -- WOULD NOT HAVE BEEN ADDRESSED UNTIL PHASE II OF THE NEGOTIATIONS, THUS NARROWING THE RANGE OF PHASE II NEGOTIATIONS REGARDING REDUCTIONS BY WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS. THE ALLIES STATED THAT THEY HAD THEREBY BULLY MET EASTERN DEMANDS FOR MOVEMENT TO THE MIDDLE GROUND BETWEEN THE POSITIONS OF THE TWO SIDES ON THE QUESTION OF WHOSE FORCES SHOULD BE REDUCED FROM THE OUTSET, AND INVITED THE EAST TO MATCH WESTERN FLEXIBILITY.

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III. EASTERN APPROACH

12. DURING THE SPRING RECESS, THE WARSAW PACT POLITICAL CONSULTATIVE COMMITTEE APPEARED TO HAVE REAFFIRMED THE BASIS EASTERN POSITIONS. CONSEQUENTLY, THE EASTERN REPRESENTATIVES BEGAN THIS ROUND WITH HARDLINE POSITIONS BASED ON THEIR NOVEMBER 8 PROGRAM. THEY APPEARED TO BE IN A STOCK-TAKING PERIOD AND SEEMED TO PREFER TO PROBE FOR POSSIBLE MODIFICATIONS IN ALLIED POSITIONS.

13. THE FOCUS OF THE INFORMAL MEETINGS WAS ON THE AGREED SUBJECT OF "SHOSE FORCES SHOULD BE REDUCED FROM THE OUTSET." DURING THE INTIAL WEEKS OF THE THIRD ROUND, DISCUSSION FELL NEARLY ENTIRELY WITHIN THE ALLIED FRAMEWORK PROPOSAL. AFTER THE FIRST 2-3 WEEKS, EASTERN REPRESENTATIVES RESURRECTED THEIR SYMBOLIC REDUCTIONS PROPOSAL AT THE MAY 28 INFORMAL MEETING, AND DEVELOPED IT SOMEWHAT FURTHER IN THE FOLLOWING TWO WEEKS. THROUGH THE MECHANISM OF THIS FIRST STEP PROPOSAL, THE EAST APPEARED TO BE SEEKING TO DRAW THE DISCUSSION ON TO THEIR OWN PROGRAM, AND PARTICULARLY ITS FIRST STAGE. THEY VIGOROUSLY SOUGHT WESTERN AGREEMENT TO ACCEPT THE CONCEPT OF A SIMPLIFIED FIRST STEP.

14. THOUGH EASTERN REPRESENTATIVES NEVER CLEARLY DEFINED THE ELEMENTS OF THIS FIRST STEP, THEY HAD BY THE END OF THIS ROUND PUT FORWARD THE FOLLOWING SUGGESTIONS (NOT ALL OF THEM FULLY COMPATIBLE WITH EACH OTHER):

A. FIRST, IN THE CONTEXT OF THE EASTERN SYMBOLIC REDUCTION PROPOSAL AND SUBSEQUENT FIRST STEP PROPOSAL, THE EAST SUGGESTED THAT THERE MIGHT BE TWO OR EVEN MORE SEPARATE NEGOTIATIONS AND AGREEMENTS, AND SUGGESTED THAT THERE COULD BE A PROVISION IN THE FIRST AGREEMENT PROVIDING FOR CONTINUATION OF THE NEGOTIATIONS IN A SECOND NEGOTIATION.

B. IN DESCRIBING THE EASTERN FIRST STEP PROPOSAL,
THE EAST SUGGESTED THAT THE FIRST STEP WOULD NOT BE
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AN INTEGRAL PART OF THEIR NOVEMBER 8 PROGRAM, THAT
ITS ACCEPTANCE WOULD NOT PREJUDICE FOLLOW-ON
NEGOTIATIONS; THAT THIS COULD BE STATED IN THE AGREEMENT;
THAT REDUCTIONS SHOULD BE 20,000 ON EACH SIDE; BUT
THAT A FIGURE (OR PERCENTAGE) OTHER THAN 20,000 MEN ON
EACH SIDE COULD BE AGREED.

C. IN THE CONTEXT OF THE EASTERN FIRST STEP
PROPOSAL, THE EAST SUGGESTED THAT THE BULK OF REDUCTIONS
IN THE FIRST STEP MIGHT BE TAKEN BY THE US AND THE USSR.

D. IN THE CONTEXT OF THE FIRST STEP PROPOSAL,
THE EAST SUGGESTED STAGED IMPLEMENTATION OF A FIRST
REDUCTION AGREEMENT, WHICH WOULD BE COMPLETED BY
THE END OF 1975, WITH REDUCTIONS BY THE US AND SOVIET
UNION AND PERHAPS SOME OTHERS STARTING FIRST, AND
REDUCTIONS BY THE REMAINDER OF THE DIRECT PARTICIPANTS
STARTING LATER IN THE FIRST STEP.

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15. AT ONE POINT, IN THE PRECEDING ROUND, IN DISCUSSING THEIR SYMBOLIC REDUCTION PROPOSAL WITH ALLIED REPRESENTATIVES, THE EAST HAD SUGGESTED THAT EACH SIDE COULD APPORTION REDUCTIONS AMONG ITS OWN MEMBERS ON THE UNDERSTANDING THAT ALL WOULD REDUCE AND THAT REDUCTIONS WOULD NOT ESTABLISH NATIONAL SUBCEILINGS. HOWEVER, IN THIS ROUND, THE EAST CLAIMED THAT THE ALLIES HAD TAKEN THE COMMENTS ON INDEPENDENT DISTRIBUTION OF REDUCTIONS ON EACH SIDE OUT OF CONTEXT; BUT ADDED THE VIEW THAT EACH SIDE COULD MAKE PROPOSALS AS TO THIS DISTRIBUTION. AS REGARDS NATIONAL SUBCEILINGS, EASTERN REPRESENTATIVES WATERED DOWN THEIR INDICATION IN THE SECONDRound IN CONNECTION WITH THEIR SYMBOLIC REDUCTION PROPOSAL
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THAT IT MIGHT BE POSSIBLE TO AVOID SUCH CEILINGS, BUT THEY DID INDICATE READINESS TO DISCUSS THE GENERAL TOPIC IN THE CONTEXT OF A FIRST STEP AGREEMENT ALONG THEIR LINES. FROM TIME TO TIME IN CONVERSATIONS WITH ALLIED REPRESENTATIVES, SOME EASTERN REPRESENTATIVES ALSO HAVE MENTIONED THAT IT MIGHT BE A THEORETICAL SOLUTION TO DEFER REDUCTIONS BY A NUMBER OF DIRECT PARTICIPANTS OTHER THAN THE US AND THE USSR TO A SECOND NEGOTIATION. IN THIS CONTEXT, THEY HAVE ALSO SOUGHT TO MAINTAIN THEIR DISTINCTION BETWEEN "FOREIGN" AND "NATIONAL" FORCES. HOWEVER, THE EAST HAS SUBSEQUENTLY ALSO DENIED ADVANCING THIS IDEA AS A SPECIFIC PROPOSAL.

16. EASTERN READINESS TO SHOW ANY FLEXIBILITY ON PHASING SO FAR HAS APPEARED ONLY IN THE CONTEXT OF THEIR FIRST STEP PROPOSAL. MOREOVER, THE EAST HAS REFUSED TO ANSWER DETAILED QUESTIONS ON PHASING ASPECTS OF THEIR FIRST STEP PROPOSAL UNLESS THE ALLIES AGREE IN PRINCIPLE TO SEARCH FOR SUCH A FIRST STEP AGREEMENT. SOME EASTERN REPRESENTATIVES ALSO HAVE HINTED AT A READINESS TO BE MORE FORTH-

COMING ON PHASING GIVEN AN ALLIED WILLINGNESS TO DISCUSS THE SCOPE OF REDUCTIONS WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF A FIRST STEP AGREEMENT.

17. ALLIED REPRESENTATIVES HAVE DECLINED TO DISCUSS THE EASTERN FIRST STEP PROPOSAL. THE MAIN ALLIED OBJECTION IS THAT SUCH A "FIRST STEP" WOULD CODIFY THE EXISTING FORCE IMBALANCE AND THUS UNDERCUT THE ALLIED CASE FOR ASYMMETRY AND A COMMON CEILING. THE ALLIES ALSO HAVE POINTED OUT THAT IT PROVIDES AN UNACCEPTABLE ANSWER TO THE QUESTION OF WHOSE FORCES SHOULD BE REDUCED FROM THE OUTSET, AND THAT IT IS BASED ON EQUAL AMOUNTS OF REDUCTIONS BY THE TWO SIDES AND THUS DOES NOT DEAL WITH THE PROBLEM OF DISPARITIES.

IV. SOM ISSUES

18. EASTERN REPRESENTATIVES HAVE MAINTAINED THEIR SECRET

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POSITION THAT ALL TYPES OF FORCES, INCLUDING AIR AND NUCLEAR FORCES, SHOULD BE REDUCED. IN A PLENARY STATMENT DELIVERED JUNE 27, THE POLISH REPRESENTATIVE IMPLICITLY LINKED EASTERN DEMANDS FOR REDUCTIONS IN ALLIED NUCLEAR FORCES, WITH WESTERN DEMANDS FOR REDUCTIONS IN PACT TANK STRENGTH. IN THE CONTEXT OF THE EASTERN FIRST STEP PROPOSAL, HOWEVER, SOVIET REPRESENTATIVES HAVE SUGGESTED THAT TREATMENT OF SOME ISSUES MIGHT BE DEFERRED UNTIL THE FOLLOW-UP ROUND OF NEGOTIATIONS. THIS MAY HAVE BEEN A HINT THAT THE EAST DID NOT INTEND TO PRESS FOR INCLUSION OF ARMAMENTS, FOR EXAMPLE TANKS, NUCLEAR AND AIR FORCES, IN THEIR FIRST REDUCTION STEP.

19. THE EAST IS NOT WILLING AT THIS POINT IN THE NEGOTIATIONS TO ENTER INTO A DISCUSSION OF DATA. HOWEVER, THE SOVIET REPRESENTATIVE HAS REPEATEDLY CRITICIZED THE ALLIED DEFINITION OF GROUND FORCES. HE HAS ARGUED THAT IT IS UNFAIR THAT THE WEST HAS INCLUDED IN ITS TOTALS FOR THE WARSAW PACT CERTAIN PERSONNEL IN THE GROUND AIR DEFENSE FORCES OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA AND POLAND WHILE NOT INCLUDING IN THE WESTERN TOTAL FOR NATO GROUND FORCES COMPARABLE AIR DEFENSE PERSONNEL OF OTHER NATO COUNTRIES. AS INDICATED IN THE AHG MESSAGE OF JULY 4, THE ALLIES TOLD THE EAST THAT THEY WERE READY TO RECONSIDER THE APPLICATION OF THE ALLIED DEFINITION OF GROUND FORCES WITH A VIEW TO DEALING WITH SOME OF THE

INCONSISTENCIES WHICH EASTERN REPRESENTATIVES HAVE MENTIONED. EASTERN REPRESENTATIVES NOTED THE POINT AND SIAD THEY WOULD CONSIDER WHAT THE ALLIED REPRESENTATIVES HAD SAID. HOWEVER, THEY INSISTED THAT IT REMAINED THE EASTERN VIEW THAT ALL FORCES SHOULD BE INCLUDED IN REDUCTIONS.

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MBFR NEGOTIATIONS

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20. ALLIED REPRESENTATIVES CONTINUE TO PRESS THE COMMON CEILING CONCEPT. THEY ALSO CONTINUE TO MAKE IT CLEAR THAT PARTICIPATION IN PHASE II REDUCTIONS BY NON-US NATO DIRECT PARTICIPANTS IS CONDITIONAL ON THE CONCLUSION OF A SATISFACTORY PHASE I AGREEMENT, WHICH WOULD INCLUDE US-SOVIET REDUCTIONS AND AGREEMENT ON THE COMMON CEILING CONCEPT. BUT SO FAR THERE HAS BEEN NO PROGRESS REGARDING EASTERN ACCEPTANCE OF ASYMMETRICAL REDUCTIONS. IN FACT, A MAJOR SOVIET THEME IN THE CURRENT NEGOTIATING ROUND,

STATED REPEATEDLY IN PLENARIES, INFORMALS AND BILATERALS, HAS BEEN THAT THE WESTERN PROGRAM AS PRESENTED SO FAR IS SO INEQUITABLE AS TO PRODUCE UNILATERAL MILITARY ADVANTAGES, WHICH ALLEGEDLY CONFLICT WITH THE AGREED PRINCIPLE OF UNDIMINISHED SECURITY. AT THE JULY 17 PLENARY, KHLESTOV ATTRIBUTED THE LACK OF AGREEMENT SO FAR TO THE ALLIED AIM OF CHANGING THE CURRENT RELATIONSHIP OF
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FORCES TO NATO'S UNILATERAL ADVANTAGE, "AN ARRANGEMENT WHICH CONTRADICTS THE AGREED AIM OF THE NEGOTIATIONS." THE EAST CONTINUES TO MAINTAIN THAT THE WESTERN NUCLEAR ADVANTAGE IN THE AREA AS WELL AS OTHER ELEMENTS OF WESTERN STRENGTH RESULTS IN AN OVERALL BALANCE IN CENTRAL EUROPE. AND THE EAST CITES RECENT STATEMENTS BY SENIOR ALLIED STATESMEN TO SUPPORT THAT VIEW.

21. THE WEST HAS RESTATED ITS GENERAL RESERVATION REGARDING TREATMENT OF THE HUNGARIAN QUESTION. HUNGARIAN REPRESENTATIVE PETRAN REPLIED IN THE JULY 17 PLENARY MEETING BY REITERATING THE STANDARD EASTERN POSITION ON HUNGARY.

22. AS REGARDS THE IMPORTANT ISSUE OF SECURITY OF THE FLANKS, ALLIED REPRESENTATIVES HAVE STRESSED THAT AGREEMENTS MUST SAFEGUARD AND NOT DIMINISH THE SECURITY OF THE SPECIAL PARTICIPANTS. THE EASTERN SIDE SEEMS TO ACCEPT IN GENERAL TERMS THIS ALLIED REQUIREMENT.

23. ON STABILIZING MEASURES, THE ALLIES HAVE REMINDED THE EAST, IN PARTICULAR AT THE JULY 4 PLENARY, OF THE CONCRETE PROPOSALS THEY HAVE MADE. THEY HAVE STRESSED THE IMPORTANCE THEY ATTACH TO THESE PROPOSALS. THE EAST HAS NOT ADDRESSED THE SUBJECT DURING THE CURRENT ROUND. ON VERIFICATION AND NON-CIRCUMVENTION, THE ALLIES HAVE REITERATED THEIR GENERAL POSITIONS, BUT THERE HAS BEEN NO DISCUSSION OF THESE SUBJECTS AS YET.

V. CONCLUSION

24. NEGOTIATION IN THE THIRD ROUND HAS CENTERED ON THE ISSUE OF WHOSE FORCES WILL BE REDUCED FROM THE OUTSET. DESPITE THE INTRODUCTION BY THE ALLIES OF THE FOUR NEW LINKAGE ITEMS, THE EAST HAS CONTINUED TO INSIST THAT ALL DIRECT PARTICIPANTS TAKE REDUCTIONS IN THE FIRST STEP. THE ALLIES HAVE ASKED THE EAST FOR A CONSIDERED REACTION TO THE LATEST ALLIED PROPOSAL THAT THE REMAINING WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS WOULD CONSIDER UNDERTAKING A COMMITMENT TO REDUCE IN A SECOND PHASE. ANY REPLY WHICH THE EAST GIVES FOLLOWING RESUMPTION OF THE NEGOTIATIONS WILL BE MORE AUTHORITATIVE THAN THEIR INITIAL NEGATIVE REACTIONS IN THIS ROUND.
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25. IT IS POSSIBLE THAT THE EAST MIGHT AFTER THE SUMMER RECESS MOVE IN THE DIRECTION OF ACCEPTING THE PROPOSED ALLIED SOLUTION TO THE QUESTION OF WHOSE FORCES SHOULD BE REDUCED FROM THE OUTSET. HOWEVER, ON THE BASIS OF INDICATIONS PRESENTLY AVAILABLE, IT IS MORE LIKELY THAT THE EAST WILL DECLINE, EVEN ON A TENTATIVE BASIS, TO RESOLVE THIS ISSUE BY AGREEING THAT ONLY THE US AND USSR WILL REDUCE IN PHASE ONE.

26. A NUMBER OF FACTORS MAY BE AT WORK HERE. THE EAST APPEARS TO FEAR THAT EVEN TENTATIVE AGREEMENT IN PRINCIPLE TO REDUCE US AND SOVIET FORCES FIRST WOULD SERIOUSLY PREJUDICE OTHER IMPORTANT ELEMENTS OF THE EASTERN PROGRAM, IN PARTICULAR, THE PRINCIPLE THAT REDUCTIONS SHOULD BE EQUAL IN SIZE (OR THAT THEY SHOULD REPRESENT EQUAL PERCENTAGES OF THE OVERALL FORCE TOTALS ON EACH SIDE). IN THIS SENSE, THE SOVIETS MAY BE CONVINCED THAT LIMITING FIRST PHASE REDUCTIONS TO US AND SOVIET FORCES WOULD PERMIT THE ALLIES TO ARGUE THAT THE SOVIETS SHOULD TAKE TWICE AS MANY REDUCTIONS AS THE US SINCE THERE ARE MORE THAN TWICE AS MANY SOVIET AS US GROUND FORCES IN THE AREA.

27. THERE ALSO IS THE QUESTION OF STATUS. THE SOVIETS ARE RELUCTANT TO ENTER INTO A COMMITMENT TO REDUCE THEIR FORCES IF OTHER BENEFICIARIES OF THAT SOVIET COMMITMENT DO NOT ALSO REDUCE. IN ADDITION, THE SOVIETS PROBABLY SUSPECT THAT THE ALLIED PHASING APPROACH IS A MECHANISM BY WHICH SOME ALLIES COULD AVOID PHASE ONE REDUCTIONS AND EVENTUALLY ESCAPE REDUCTIONS ALTOGETHER.

28. ONE FURTHER FACTOR MAY BE SOVIET RELUCTANCE TO MOVE AHEAD IN THE VIENNA TALKS UNTIL THE MAJOR OUTSTANDING ISSUES IN CSCE HAVE BEEN RESOLVED, AT LEAST IN PRINCIPLE. THUS, THERE IS A DISTINCT POSSIBILITY THAT THE NEXT ROUND OF THE MBFR NEGOTIATIONS WILL NOT, AT LEAST UNTIL CSCE MOVES TOWARD A CONCLUSION, BRING SUBSTANTIVE PROGRESS. ON THE OTHER HAND, IF SUCH PROGRESS BECOMES POSSIBLE, ALLIED CONSULTATIONS SHOULD HAVE PROGRESSED TO THE POINT WHERE THE WEST COULD MOVE AHEAD PROBABLY WITH ITS POSITION.

29. IT IS STRONGLY IN THE WESTERN INTEREST TO MAINTAIN THE INITIATIVE IN THE VIENNA TALKS. THIS WILL PROVIDE THE BEST
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BASIS FOR FOCUSING DISCUSSION ON THE ALLIED PROGRAM AND
FOR ULTIMATELY BRINGING THE EAST AROUND TO NEGOTIATING ON

ITS BASIS. THIS HAS
BEEN THE UNDERLYING RATIONALE OF THE ALLIED TACTICAL APPROACH
IN THE NEGOTIATIONS.

30. EQUALLY IMPORTANT IS THE NEED FOR THE WEST TO MAINTAIN
THE CREDIBILITY OF ITS NEGOTIATING APPROACH. THE WEST
MUST BE IN A POSITION TO DEAL EFFECTIVELY WITH EASTERN
CRITICISMS OF THE ALLIED PROGRAM. THE WEST SHOULD BE READY TO
DEMONSTRATE BOTH TO THE EAST AND, AS NEEDED, TO WESTERN
PUBLIC OPINION, THAT IT HAS TAKEN REASONABLE
EASTERN CRITICISMS AND CONCERNS INTO ACCOUNT, AND THAT
LEGITIMATE EASTERN SECURITY
INTERESTS CAN BE ACCOMMODATED WITHIN THE ALLIED PROGRAM.

31. FOR THESE REASONS, THE AHG CONCLUDES THAT IT WILL
BE IMPROTTANT FOR THE ALLIES TO CONTINUE TO DEVELOP THEIR
PROGRAM AT A DELIBERATE PACE DURING THE NEXT ROUND, MAKING
POSSIBLE OFFERS CONDITIONAL UPON GAINING EQUIVALENT EASTERN
ACTIONS. ACCORDINGLY, PART TWO OF THIS REPORT CONTAINS A LIST
OF ITEMS ON WHICH THE AHG REQUESTS THE COUNCIL'S GUIDANCE.

END TEXT. RESOR

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